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SPECIALIZATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO UNEVEN JUSTICE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN THE JUVENILE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
By: Allison Cleveland 1

Rather than focus on process and precedent,
problem-solving justice focuses on the
outcome. Problem solving courts are
“specialized courts that seek to respond to
persistent social, human, and legal problems,
such as addiction, family dysfunction,
domestic violence, mental illness, and qualityof-life crime.” These courts adapt their
processes to suit the sources of the problems,
which are driving the actions that bring the
wrongdoer to court in the ﬁrst place. The
focus is on the individual, and the courts
provide particularized responses designed
to change that speciﬁc offender’s future
behavior.
- Kathryn C. Sammons2
I. Introduction
In October of this year, I observed an initial hearing
at the Boston Juvenile Court for a care and protection case
involving four children, all less than ﬁve years of age.3 The
Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (“DCF”)
presented evidence that the mother used cocaine during her
pregnancy with the youngest of the four children–a newborn.
This was the entirety of the DCF case. The other three children
were present at the hearing and appeared to be very happy,
energetic, and well-cared for. Though the children’s mother
and father did not live together, they still saw each other socially
and coordinated child care. Counsel for the mother argued
that the DCF presented no nexus between the mother’s drug
use and her ability to care for her older children. The older
children, reasoned the mother’s counsel, should therefore
remain in her care. The judge reviewed documents submitted
into evidence and came to the father’s criminal record. Noting
multiple restraining orders against the father for domestic
abuse, the judge voiced concern about the mother’s failure to
separate herself from a man with such an extensive history of
domestic abuse. Accordingly, the judge ordered DCF to take
custody of all four children.
Following the hearing, I spoke with another juvenile
court judge. I admitted my surprise that all four children were
removed from their mother’s home based on their father’s
violent history against women. The judge was not surprised
by the outcome and voiced his strong feeling that the outcome
was correct. He noted that, based on the ﬁrm language used
by the Supreme Judicial Court in Custody of Vaughn,4 juvenile
court judges take no risks in situations involving domestic
abuse. The court would rather remove a child from his or her
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family than run the risk of abuse. As here, evidence of intimate
partner violence is enough to remove children from the home.
He underscored the harm that he believes can be done to a
child by simply observing abuse and his belief that mothers
are not likely to escape the cycle of intimate partner violence.
In the ensuing weeks, I observed more cases in
which children were removed from their families and placed
into DCF custody based largely on the mother’s status as a
domestic violence victim. These decisions continued to strike
me. Would the outcome be different in other courts? Would
the outcome differ, speciﬁcally, in courts that specialize in
domestic violence cases?
This paper examines the ways in which judges in the
juvenile and domestic violence courts have dealt with, and are
likely to deal with, cases of intimate partner violence where
children live in the household. Speciﬁcally, this paper suggests
that the divergent goals of these two specialty courts likely
result in uneven justice. In juvenile courts, a judge’s focus is on
the welfare of the child. Consequently, children are more likely
to be removed from an abused parent’s custody to protect the
child’s physical safety. In domestic violence courts, on the
other hand, judges are likely to adopt a more favorable position
toward domestic violence survivors, in that the abused party
is seen less as a victim and more as a capable caretaker. This
is especially true in jurisdictions where more services exist
to help victims become self-sustaining, as custody in those
jurisdictions appears more likely to be awarded to the nonabusive parent as part of the rehabilitation process.
II. Specialization: The Domestic Violence
and Juvenile and Courts
Domestic Violence Courts
“Domestic violence courts,” as the name implies, are
specialized courts that adjudicate cases involving domestic
violence. The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) (Title
IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994)5 routed substantial funds into the nation’s court
systems and other areas of criminal justice to demand more
accountability from domestic violence perpetrators and to
provide help and safety to victims.6 Beginning in the 1990s,
courts nationwide began to allocate special court sessions
and other procedural resources for domestic violence cases.7
These “domestic violence courts” were deemed necessary,
in part, to handle the growing number of domestic violence
cases as arrests for partner abuse became mandatory and
as district attorneys faced increasing pressure to prosecute
such crimes.8 There are currently more than 300 courts
17

with special procedures in place to handle domestic violence
matters.9 The goals of specialized domestic violence courts
around the country have been relatively uniform and include
protecting and empowering domestic violence survivors10 in
addition to holding perpetrators accountable.11 Improving
case management efﬁciency is also often cited as a goal.12
Domestic violence courts vary greatly in structure.13
Some domestic violence courts may hear only requests for civil
restraining orders, while others may adjudicate all issues—such
as restraining orders, criminal charges, and divorce and custody
issues—for a single family when domestic violence is involved.
The term “domestic violence court” can encompass anything
from specialized intake processes to an actual separate court
system dedicated to domestic violence cases.14 For example,
in 1987, the Quincy District Court in Quincy, Massachusetts
began its Domestic Violence Prevention Program, a procedural
system designed to efﬁciently address domestic violence
cases. Although not a separate court, the program integrated
a network of judges, clerks, police ofﬁcers, prosecutors,
perpetrator’s intervention programs, and other agencies to
streamline the system in which victims and perpetrators of
domestic violence would have their problems addressed.15 In
2001, Massachusetts instituted its ﬁrst (and only) domestic
violence court in Dorchester.16
Generally, domestic violence courts will, at a minimum,
hold specialized sessions for restraining orders and other civil
matters involving intimate partner violence. Special attention
will also be afforded to victims. Elena Salzman describes what
a victim can expect in the Quincy District Court:
When a woman comes to the Quincy
District Court seeking a restraining
order, her ﬁrst contact will likely be
with a domestic abuse clerk in the
Restraining Orders Ofﬁce. The Quincy
Program innovators felt that the
establishment of a separate restraining
orders ofﬁce would be more conducive
to providing the one-on-one assistance
women need to ﬁll out the proper
paperwork. . . . A woman entering the
court is often confused, scared, and
uncertain. The clerks help provide the
security a woman needs to embark on
the intimidating process of requesting
a restraining order.
Many of the domestic abuse clerks in
Quincy are volunteer interns from law
schools and social work programs at
local universities. Their duties include
disseminating: a sheet listing the
critical information the woman should
provide to the assisting clerk;
18

a sheet detailing procedures on how
to ﬁle a drug/alcohol petition; and
an informational brochure entitled
“Help and Protection for Families
Experiencing Violence in the Home,”
which includes a list of emergency
resources.
After the initial intake procedure,
domestic abuse clerks refer the woman
to the daily brieﬁng sessions hosted by
the District Attorney’s Ofﬁce. During
these sessions, women not only receive
information about referral services and
their legal rights, but they also receive
emotional support. After the brieﬁng,
a clerk accompanies a woman to the
courtroom for her emergency hearing,
which is usually conducted ex parte,
without the batterer or his counsel
present. Often the clerk will stand
with the woman before the bench to
provide moral support. 17
Domestic violence courts have received widespread
praise for reducing case ﬁlings related to violence between
intimate partners.18 Victims also appear to be generally satisﬁed
with their court experiences and the adjudication process.19
However, specialized domestic violence courts are not without
critics. Some argue that such courts are victim-oriented and
focus so heavily on holding perpetrators accountable that
there is a bias in favor of alleged victims.20 The criminal
defense bar has been especially concerned, complaining that
“judicial education about family abuse and extended tenure
on a calendar devoted to such cases creates a pro-victim, antidefense bias.”21
I interviewed a local Boston defense attorney who
represents alleged abusers. She strongly echoed the sentiment
that Dorchester Domestic Violence Court judges are “much
harder” on defendants than their district court counterparts,
often denying bail or setting bail much higher than defendants
can afford. In her opinion, this placed an unreasonable burden
on defendants and resulted in differential treatment across
courts.22 It is perhaps unsurprising that a local prosecutor in
the Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit held a different
opinion. Domestic violence courts, she reasoned, appropriately
recognize the danger that perpetrators of domestic violence
pose to victims and to society-at-large. In her view, the
seriousness with which domestic violence crimes have been
treated in these specialized courts is a model for the district
courts to follow.23
Internal criticism also exists. Domestic violence judges
themselves have cited increased workloads and emotional
burnout as disadvantages of specialization.24 Externally, some
have expressed concern that domestic violence courts usurp
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the power of the legislature by enforcing court-made domestic
violence policy.25
Finally, confusion sometimes arises where district
court domestic violence programs lack jurisdiction over
certain matters, resulting in conﬂicting orders between courts.
Massachusetts, for example, solved this problem by giving the
Dorchester Domestic Violence Court jurisdiction over criminal
and civil matters in domestic violence cases.26
Juvenile Courts
Juvenile courts are not new to the judicial system.
Special courts to adjudicate child neglect and delinquency
cases originated more than one hundred years ago, in Cook
County, Illinois, and all states now have a juvenile court
system.27 Juvenile courts have broad jurisdiction over matters
involving children. The special subject matter jurisdiction of
any particular state’s juvenile court system is proscribed by state
statute,28 and usually includes adjudicating child welfare cases
(regarding child care and protection), delinquency cases, and
issues involving children in need of services.29 In all contexts,
the mandate of the juvenile court is to protect the best interests
of the subject child.30
The juvenile court system is grounded in the philosophy
that “when parents are unable to care for or discipline a child,
it becomes the state’s duty to intervene on the child’s behalf.
This is the [concept] called parens patriae.”31 The ultimate
goal of the juvenile courts, therefore, is to protect the interests
of the child, even when the child’s interests conﬂict with the
fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody
and control of their children.32 This emphasis on the child’s
interest in remaining safe from harm is especially important
in the context of intimate partner violence, where one parent,
though “ﬁt” in other ways, may be viewed as unable to protect
the child.33
The Importance of Specialized Knowledge in Domestic Violence Cases
Domestic violence cases can present special problems
to judges.34 Because domestic violence is common and likely
to be relevant to many legal actions,35 it is advisable that
judges and court staff receive specialized training.36 Because
decisions about custody are among the most important
decisions made in the judicial system,37 and there is a strong
probability that domestic violence will be considered as a factor
in those decisions, training in domestic violence is especially
important for judges38 who make decisions regarding custody
and visitation.39 Most states require the court to consider
domestic violence issues when awarding custody and visitation
rights.40 Without knowledge of the particular dynamics of
each situation involving intimate partner violence, judges
may be misled by information received in court. Victims of
domestic violence often make poor witnesses.41 The trauma
experienced by victims may manifest itself as nervousness,
timidity, and body language that may be perceived as suspect
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or deceptive by the judge.42 In addition “[w]ithout . . .
understanding of the dynamics of intimate partner violence,
a judge may question the ability of an individual to tolerate
such severe acts of violence. . . . As a result, a judge may
question the actual level of violence or the victim’s motives
if she remained in the abusive relationship. . .”43 Abusers,
on the other hand, are often conﬁdent and self-controlled,
giving an appearance of reliability and truthfulness in court.44
Despite appearances, abusers can be, and often are, “master
manipulators.”45 Domestic violence includes “tactics [that] are
more than physical violence and include a penumbra of threats
and actions to induce fear, humiliation, social isolation and
resource deprivation. Batterers cast aspersions on the moral
character, parenting and mental health of battered women to
discredit them with those who might intervene.”46 Moreover,
although a batterer may appear calm and trustworthy on the
stand, he likely still presents a danger to his victim, even when
they no longer reside in the same home. Indeed, the most
dangerous period for an abused woman47 is immediately after
separation, when her abuser may—in a panic—take desperate
measures to regain control.48
Victims may also not be seen in a favorable light when
a judge evaluates the best interests of the child for custody
purposes.49 Best interest factors focus on the stability and
security of the child’s environment, putting domestic violence
victims at a disadvantage.50 Victims are often dependent on
their abusers for housing, income and other forms of support.51
Consequently, separation from her batterer may leave a mother
without immediate access to a job and ﬁnancial resources. As
noted by Betsy McAlister Groves:
When a mother decides to leave
her partner, the children’s situation
may actually worsen. Mothers (and
children) are at continued or increased
risk of being harmed after they make
the decision to leave the relationship.
The batterer often reacts with anger,
disbelief, and increased attempts to
control the woman’s relationship.
Many women we have seen in the
Child Witness to Violence Project
described escalating danger as their
partners
attempted,
sometimes
through desperate means, to ﬁnd them
and persuade them to return home. 52
Taken together, these patterns are not intuitive. Special
knowledge on the part of judges and others in the criminal
justice system is therefore needed to effectively address the
special problems of families affected by domestic violence.
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III.

The Domestic Violence Courts

As noted above, the domestic violence courts are
victim-oriented. These courts protect and empower victims
and hold abusers accountable for their violent behavior.53 In
addition, because judges in domestic violence courts
have specialized knowledge regarding domestic violence, they
are much more likely to grasp the patterns and complexities
involved where violence occurs in the home.54 This is not only
because judges and other court ofﬁcers hear domestic violence
cases so frequently, but also because judges often receive
specialized training and tend to engage in frequent dialogue
regarding the functioning of the courts, how parties are being
served, and how the court system could do better.55
As a result of specialized knowledge, judges in
domestic violence courts are likely to perceive victims as logical
and capable people, rather than as “battered women” trapped
in a “cycle of violence.” While the learned helplessness
concept of Battered Women’s Syndrome56 still pervades the
general court system, judges in the domestic violence courts
have greater exposure to the currently recognized variation in
survivor personalities, capabilities, and resources. They are less
likely to become caught up in the mental trap described by two
legal scholars below:
Lawyers and judges subscribing to the
‘Why doesn’t she just leave?’ theory
too often ignore the battered woman’s
experience-based determination that
leaving may be more dangerous to
her and the child than staying. As a
result, battered women seeking justice
in a family law context may well face
two unnerving consequences: more
abuse from the batterer and state
coercive authority to remove her
children against her will on grounds
that a ‘traumatized’ person is less ﬁt to
care for her children than the parent
who is responsible for the abuse. The
critical family law assumption clouds
the legal system’s capacity to see that
the victimized parent’s decision may
have a secure foundation – that the
victimized parent is indeed capable of
complex thinking and acting, including
performing subtle acts of compliance,
resistance, and direct action to further
her own and her children’s safety and
autonomy in the world in which she
lives. 57
In practice, it is certainly much easier to allow custody
to remain with the logical, capable mother described above than
with a helpless victim. In this light, survivors are more likely to
20

be seen as capable caretakers. Domestic violence courts tend
to adopt the “criminal law facet of domestic violence,” which
“recognizes that one intimate partner is a perpetrator and one
is a victim . . . and seeks to hold the perpetrator accountable.” 58
In contrast, family law views conﬂict in terms of two intimate
partners who must ﬁnd ways to cooperatively regulate their
relationship and their family affairs. Because the juvenile court
focuses so intently on the child, it is reasonable to believe that
juvenile court judges are more inclined toward the “family law”
perspective.
IV.

The Juvenile Courts

As noted above, the goal of any case in the juvenile
court is to protect the best interests of the child. As one
Boston juvenile court judge indicated,59 he and his fellow
judges make the physical and emotional safety of the
child paramount. They act on the demands articulated in
Vaughn,60 removing the child where it is possible that the
child may suffer physical or emotional harm as a result of
domestic violence in the home.61
Given the ways in which the juvenile court typically
functions, it is not surprising that children would be removed
from homes in which domestic violence occurs. First, the
juvenile court relies strongly on department of social services
expertise.62 The department is invariably a party in abuse and
neglect cases, and will take a position on whether it believes the
child should be removed from the home. As one commentator
notes, child welfare departments often have a checkered history
in terms of domestic violence cases,63 at least from the point
of view of domestic violence victims.64 She describes these
views as follows:65
[O]pponents claim that child protective
involvement in cases of childhood
exposure to domestic violence typically
has not served the best interests of
children or their abused caregivers.
Opponents argue that such intervention
traditionally has been ineffective,
discriminatory,
and
destructive,
endangering the safety of adult victims
and their children, blaming battered
women for their children’s exposure,
and reﬂexively removing children
from their abused parent’s custody.
Finally, opponents argue that not all
children exposed to domestic violence
are harmed by their exposure, and thus
intrusive government intervention
and its negative concomitants will be
extended to many families where such
intervention is unnecessary.
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My own conversations with local attorneys support
this view. One victim advocate opined that the Massachusetts
Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) is extremely
quick to take custody of children whose mothers are abused
following a report of a domestic disturbance.66 A local defense
attorney vigorously agreed, saying that “DCF seems to show
up as soon as an incident is reported to the police. Before a
victim can even get a restraining order, her kids are in DCF
custody.”67 Whether or not these accounts exaggerate, it is
logical to assume that child welfare agencies, like
the courts, err on the side of caution to prevent physical
harm to the child. It is not unlikely that judges are heavily
inﬂuenced by child welfare departments in court, particularly
when the alternative is to risk putting a child in a dangerous
environment. Courts and child welfare agencies have a shared
policy goal to protect the child,68 suggesting that judges defer
to agency expertise where the legitimacy of a child removal
action is considered. It is reasonable to assume that this would
be particularly true where the alternative to removal is to leave
a child at risk in a dangerous environment.
Scholar Lois Weithorn69 argues that courts have
generally deferred to child welfare agency removal actions and
have historically
“blame[d] these women for any negative
ramiﬁcations of their abuse for their children;
remove[d] children from their mothers’
custody when doing so [was] not necessary
for the child’s protection; fail[ed] to hold
the abuser accountable for his conduct; and
fail[ed] to provide any services that contribute
to the short-or long-term well-being of the
child or the nonabusive parent.”70
However, juvenile court judge concerns for the safety
of the child are based in fact. For example, children in homes
in which intimate partner violence occurs are at increased risk
for physical harm.71 Between 30 % and 60 % of children whose
mothers are abused are likely to suffer abuse themselves.72 It
is also true that children who witness domestic violence are
more likely to develop emotional and psychological problems,
show aggressive behavior, and are more likely to exhibit signs
of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.73 It is unclear
whether these effects occur as a result of the child witnessing
violence, from the abuser’s dysfunctional parenting patterns in
general, or from a combination of both.74 However, social
science studies seem to support the proposition that these
problems can be counteracted to a great extent by a stable and
loving relationship with the non-abusive parent.75 If the goal
is to secure the best possible situation for each child, a pattern
of removing children from both parents, rather than just the
abuser, seems counterproductive.76
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V. Conclusion
Domestic violence courts and juvenile courts, while both
“speciality courts,” approach issues of child custody and
domestic violence from very different perspectives. Juvenile
courts, charged with protecting the child’s best interests, are
likely to err on the side of caution by removing children from
homes in which domestic violence is evident. These orders
are based largely on social science data showing the emotional
and psychological harm to children who witness violence in
the home, and on a desire to safeguard the child from physical
harm. Domestic violence courts, on the other hand, are strongly
victim-oriented and are more likely to provide services meant
to facilitate continued custody with the non-offending parent.
This approach more accurately reﬂects the social science
understanding of domestic violence phenomena, the strength
and resilience of survivors, and their competence as caregivers.
More broadly, since the divergent perspectives of these two
specialty courts are likely to result in very different decisions
regarding child custody in domestic violence situations, family
integrity very much depends on the court in which each family
ﬁnds itself.

Endnotes
Allison Cleveland is a third-year law student from Boston College
Law School.
2
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Examination of Problem-Solving Justice in
New York, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT, 923-25 (2008) (citations
omitted).
3
The hearing took place in the Suffolk Juvenile Court, Boston.
4
Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595-96, 600 (1996) (holding
that the Probate Court erred in failing to make detailed ﬁndings
about domestic violence in a custody case); Id. at 595 (“Quite simply,
abuse by a family member inﬂicted on those who are weaker and less
able to defend themselves-almost invariably a child or a woman-is a
violation of the most basic human right, the most basic condition
of civilized society: the right to live in physical security, free from
the fear that brute force will determine the conditions of one’s daily
life.”).
5
Violence Against Women Act (V. A. W. A.) of 1994, 18 U.S.C.
§1902.
6
See Anat Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth
the Trouble in Massachusetts?, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 197, 200 (2008)
(explaining that Special Training Ofﬁcers and Prosecutors (“STOP”)
grants were administered to state for the purposes of strengthening
domestic violence intervention programs and policies).
7
See Robyn Mazur & Liberty Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence
Court Work? Lessons from New York, JUDGES’ J., Spring 2003, at 5-6
(observing that domestic violence was historically perceived as a
private matter that did not warrant court invention, which is why
courts did not address domestic violence in any serious way until the
1990s). See also Amy Karan, Susan Keilitz, & Sharon Denaro, Domestic
Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We Manage Them, JUV.
& FAM. CT. J., Spring 1999, at 71 (noting that as domestic violence
cases substantially increased to be the fastest domestic relations
portion caseload that courts implemented special procedures, such
as mandatory arrests and victimless prosecution policies, to help
survivors).
1

21

Between 1989 and 1998, domestic violence ﬁlings in state courts
increased 178 percent. Maytal, supra note 5, at 207.
9
Id. at 209. The ﬁrst specialized domestic violence court was located
in Brooklyn and heard felony-level domestic violence cases, beginning
in 1996.
10
Id. at 214 (explaining that one major goal of the Quincy Program
in Massachusetts, for example, is to “empower victims” of domestic
violence). See also id. (reporting that the Qunicy Program strongly
enforces its orders on abusers to ensure compliance); Sammonds,
supra note 1, at 961 (arguing that a primary difference between
domestic violence courts and other courts is the former’s intense
focus on victims); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS: A DESCRIPTIVE
STUDY 15 (2000), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
cfcc/pdfﬁles/dvreport.pdf (reporting that California domestic
violence courts often refer domestic violence victims to support
services including victim advocates, children’s services, substance
abuse services and services for immigrants, among others).
11
See, e.g., Sammonds, supra note 1, at 958-59 (asserting that New York
domestic violence courts’ commitment to enhance victim safety and
hold perpetrators accountable). See also Maytal, supra note 5, at 214
(describing the ﬁrst dedicated domestic violence court in Brooklyn to
incorporate defendant monitoring technology to ensure court order
compliance); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, supra note 9, at 15-16 (nothing that in the California
court system, 36 of the 39 domestic violence courts regularly ordered
abusers to participate in batter’s intervention programs and 24 of
the 39 courts had regularly scheduled judicial review calendars to
monitor the abusers’ progress in these programs).
12
See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, supra note 9, at 18-19 (ﬁnding that representatives
of the domestic violence courts in California, for example, placed
greatest emphasis on (in the following order): victim and child safety,
providing services to victims, holding perpetrators accountable, and
improving case management). See also Elena Salzman, The Quincy
District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal
Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention (Note), 74 B.U. L. REV. 329,
342 (1994) (noting that the Quincy Program established “fast track”
procedures to expedite domestic violence hearings).
13
See Maytal, supra note 5, at 214 (claiming that a domestic violence
court classiﬁcation is difﬁcult due to signiﬁcant specialization
differences among domestic violence courts across jurisdictions).
14
See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that in the study that “domestic
violence court” referred to “those courts that assign judicial ofﬁcers
to hear a special domestic violence calendar, regardless of whether
the judicial ofﬁcers hear those cases exclusively or as part of a
mixed assignment” in which 39 court locations in 31 counties met
the deﬁnition within the study); Id. at 11 (stating that of the 39
courts with dedicated domestic violence calendars, 17 always referred
custody cases with an associated protective order or open domestic
violence case in the criminal courts to the domestic violence
court, while the remaining 22 courts never did so; ﬁfteen courts
always referred divorce cases to domestic violence sessions when a
restraining order or criminal case was involved, while 24 never did);
Id. (concluding that domestic violence misdemeanors were more
likely to be referred to special domestic violence sessions than were
felonies; in misdemeanor cases, 19 courts always referred, 4 sometimes
referred, and 9 never referred; in felony domestic violence cases, 9
always referred, 4 sometimes referred, and 26 never referred); Id.
at 12 (concluding that more than half of the 23 courts with special
screening departments reported screening for domestic violence
in family law cases; courts were least likely to screen criminal cases
and child abuse and neglect cases; only 5 out of 23 courts reporting
screening for domestic violence in abuse and neglect cases).
8

22

See Maytal, supra note 5, at 209.
See id. at 217.
17
Salzman, supra note 11, at 340-41.
18
Recently in Idaho, for example, the sharpest decline in domestic
violence case ﬁlings occurred in the judicial districts with domestic
violence courts. See Fred G. Zundel & Patrick D. Costello, Domestic
Violence Trends and Topics, 52 THE ADVOCATE: THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR 1 (Jan. 2009) http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/
advocate/adv09jan.pdf . But see EVE BUZAWA, GERALD HOTALING,
JAMES BYRNE & ANDREW KLEIN, RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN A PRO-ACTIVE COURT SETTING 31, available at http://www.ncjrs.
org/pdfﬁles1/nij/grants/181427.pdf (ﬁnding that between 1995 to
1996 at the Quincy Court, 86 of 353 accused abusers were ordered
into batterer treatment programs, however, successful completion of
these programs was not associated with signiﬁcantly lower re-offense
rates after one year compared to offenders who did not complete
batterer’s intervention). See also id. at 18 (noting that recidivism rates
remained high despite the aggressive system to address domestic
violence in the Quincy District Court).
19
See BUZAMA ET AL., supra note 17 (indicating that 81% of victims
were satisﬁed with their contacts with victim advocates). See also
id. at 15 (arguing that victims also perceived the court experience
as increasing their personal safety, felt that the court experience
motivated them to no longer tolerate a violent relationship, and felt
that the court provided them a sense of control in the relationship).
20
See, e.g., Maytal, supra note 5, at 226 (explaining that some domestic
violence court critics claim that court impartiality is compromised by
specialization).
21
Id.
22
Interview with Boston-area defense attorney (anonymous by
request), Boston College Law School (October, 2009).
23
Interview with Boston-area prosecutor (anonymous by request),
Boston College Law School (November, 2009). See also Maytal, supra
note 5, at 229 (“Prior to specialization, the criminal court system
arguably was biased against victims, denying them the complete
justice they deserved. Victims often could not afford proper counsel,
and the fear of retribution loomed very large when seeking help
from the courts.”).
24
Maytal, supra note 5, at 220.
25
See id. at 224-25.
26
Id. at 218.
27
See Ira M. Schwartz, Neil Alan Weiner, & Guy Enosh, Nine Lives
and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does Not Roll Over and Die, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 535 (1998).
28
Paul M. Coltoff, John R. Kennel, Anne E. Melley, Carmela Pellegrino
& Wendy Schack, Annotation, Infants, II. Protection and Control, A.
In General, 3. Courts and Their Jurisdiction, 43 C.J.S. INFANTS § 11
(2009). Although several federal statutes impact the procedures of
the juvenile court, there is no uniﬁed statute that has been considered
to inﬂuence the workings of the juvenile courts as V.A.W.A. has for
domestic violence. See, e.g., the Child Abuse and Prevention Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101 et seq. (1974) (requiring appointment of guardians ad
litem in dependency and neglect cases). See also the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601 et seq. (1974)
(requiring, among other things, that incarcerated juvenile offenders
be separated from adults).
29
See, e.g., id. Children in need of services cases are referred to as
“CHINS” cases in Massachusetts. These are also known as truancy
cases, or may take on other names, depending on the state.
30
See, e.g,, Schwartz et al., supra note 26, at 535-36.
15
16

THE MODERN AMERICAN

Id. at 535.
Id. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972) (noting that the
right to raise one’s children has been repeatedly held a fundamental
due process right).
33
See, e.g., N.J. DYFS v. S.S., 855 A.2d 8 (2004); D.D. v. Dep’t. of
Children and Families, 773 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 2000).
34
See, e.g., Sammonds, supra note 1, at 959 (arguing that domestic
violence cases are among the most “demanding” and “heartwrenching” cases for judges because many victims are reluctant to
seek legal intervention due to love, fear or economic dependence on
the offender).
35
Twenty to thirty percent of all women are assaulted by a partner
or ex-partner during their lifetime. See Betsy McAlister Groves,
Children without Refuge: Young Witnesses to Domestic Violence, 16 ZERO
TO THREE 11, 11 (1996). Moreover, in many cases, children witness
the violence. Based on restraining order forms ﬁlled out by women
seeking protection from the courts in 1994, 43,000 Massachusetts
children were exposed to domestic violence in that year. Of these,
65% were 8 years old or younger. Id. at 11. Also, in a survey of
115 mothers with a child under the age of six, one study found that
one in ten children had witnessed a kniﬁng or shooting and another
eighteen percent had seen pushing, hitting or shoving. Half of these
incidents occurred in the home. See id. at 11-12.
36
The American Bar Association supports special education for
the judiciary in the area of domestic violence. See generally THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPORT
NO. 2 (1996). See also Dana Harrington Connor, Abuse and Discretion:
Evaluating Judicial Discretion in Custody Cases Involving Violence Against
Women, 17 AM. U. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163, 165-66 (2009)
(arguing that many legal remedies involving violence against women,
including custody decisions, require special knowledge and do not
lend themselves to unrestricted discretion of a trial judge).
37
See Connor, supra note 36, at 165.
38
See, e.g., Maria L. La Ganga, Nevada Judges Must Attend Domestic
Violence Forum, L.A. TIMES, September 9, 1993, available at http://
articles.latimes.com/1993-09-09/news/mn-33232_1_domesticviolence (last visited April 9, 2009).
39
In Massachusetts, for example, “[i]n determining whether temporary
shared legal custody is or is not in the child’s best interests, the Court
must consider all relevant facts including but not limited to whether
any family member has been the perpetrator of domestic violence,
or abuses alcohol or drugs, or has deserted the child and whether
the parties have a history of cooperating in matters concerning the
child.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2010).
40
See, e.g., Harrington Connor, supra note 35, at 189. See also AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CHILD CUSTODY
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY STATE (2008), available at http:// www.
abanet.org/domviol/docs/Custody.pdf (showing all the states that
consider domestic violence as a factor inﬂuencing the child’s best
interests).
41
See Chet K. W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of
Ignorance, 41 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.. 373, 383 (2005).
42
Id.
43
Connor, supra note 36, at 177.
44
See Linda E. Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child
Custody and Access Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 411, 420 (2004) (noting
that perpetrators purposefully present public images); Joan S.
Meier, Domestic Violence Child Custody and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 690 (2003) (stating that
custody judges tend to ﬁnd abusers more credible than those their
victims).
31
32

FALL 2010

See LUNDY BANCROFT AND JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS
PARENT 15-16 (2002).
46
Andrea C. Farney & Roberta L. Valente, Creating Justice Through
Balance: Integrating Domestic Violence Law into Family Court Practice, 54
JUV. FAM. CT. J. 35 (2003).
47
This particular law article only addresses abused women, although
men are be abuse victims who may seek legal intervention.
48
See Tina Hotton, Spousal Violence After Marital Separation, 21 JURISTAT
1 (June 2001) (documenting increased risk of violence immediately
after separation). Domestic violence after separation may sometimes
result in homicide. Women in the US and Canada at greatest risk for
homicide are those with partners who have a history of domestic
abuse. See Neil Websdale, H. Moss & B. Johnson, Domestic Violence
Fatality Reviews: Implications for Law Enforcement Community, THE
POLICE CHIEF 65, 65-74 (July 2001). See also Tracee Parker, Kellie
Rogers, Meghan Collins, & Jeffrey L. Edelson, Danger Zone: Battered
Mothers and Their Families in Supervised Visitation, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, November 2008, at 1313, 1318-1320 (describing how
abusers continue to attempt to manipulate and control survivors at
supervised visitation centers, by using children to convey messages,
by sending gifts with children, by attempting to gain information
about the survivor from support staff, and by creating difﬁculties
with appointment times).
49
In custody and visitation cases, the best interest standard is applied
nationally. See, e.g., Harrington Connor, supra note 35, at 195.
50
See Jennifer L. Woolard & Sarah L. Cook, Common Goals,
Competing Interests: Preventing Violence Against Spouses and
Children, 69 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 197, 212 (2000) (explaining that
abused women are likely to lack ﬁnancial resources, may have trouble
procuring housing, and are more likely to remove the child from the
marital community).
51
See BUZAMA ET AL., supra note 17, at 31.
52
See McAlister Groves, supra note 34, at 13.
53
See supra notes 7 and 8.
54
See Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization,
58 DUKE L. J. 1667, 1671 (2009) (arguing that judicial specialization
may improve judge decision-making because specialists fare better
than generalists).
55
See, e.g., Maytal, supra note 5, at 219-220 (stating that the Dorchester
Court Roundtable allowed judges to come together to share ideas
and deliberate about relevant issues).
56
See Lenore Walker, Who Are Battered Women?, 2 FRONTIERS: A JOURNAL
OF WOMEN STUDIES 52 (1977) (describing the learned helplessness
exhibited by many “battered” women).
57
Farney & Valente, supra note 45, at 39. See also BUZAMA ET AL., supra
note17, at 16 (explaining that victims in Quincy Court cases were
accurate in predicting future offenses by their abusers, and victims
who feared serious injury were almost three times more likely to be
re-victimized).
57
Farney & Valente, supra note 45, at 39.
58
Interview with Judge of the Juvenile Court (anonymous), Suffolk
Juvenile Court, Boston (October, 2009).
59
See Vaughn, 422 Mass. at 595-96, 600.
60
Interview with Judge of the Juvenile Court (anonymous), Suffolk
Juvenile Court, Boston (October, 2009).
58
“Department of social services” is used here as a generic term to
refer to state child welfare agencies. Names of the department vary
by state.
59
See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children From Exposure to Domestic
Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 32-33 (2001) (arguing that protection system authorities often
45

23

remove children from the custody of both the abusive and nonabusive parent, citing the non-abusive parent’s “failure to protect”
the child from either direct abuse by her batterer, or from exposure
to the domestic violence).
60
See id. at 27.
61
Id.
62
Interview with Boston-area prosecutor (anonymous by request),
Boston College Law School (November, 2009).
63
Id.
64
See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 26, at 535-36.
65
See Weithorn, supra note 59, at 29.
66
Many of these concerns are exactly, in fact, what prompted the
creation of special domestic violence courts.
67
See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN
IN PERSON LIFE 42 (2007) (stating that domestic violence is the most
common context for child abuse and neglect).
68
See Jeffrey L. Edelson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and
Woman Battering, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, February 1999 at 134,
134-54.
69
See Katherine M. Kitzmann, Noni K. Gaylord, Aimee R. Holt & Erin
D. Kenny, Child Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A Meta-analytic Review, 71
J. CONSULTING CLIN. PSYCH. 339 (2003); Wanda Mohr, Megan J. Noone
Lutz, John W. Fantuzzo & Marlo A. Perry, Children Exposed to Family
Violence: A Review of Empirical Research from a Developmental-Ecological
Perspective, 1 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, AND ABUSE 264 (2000). Children are
at risk for the same problems when a divorce occurs. See Judith S.
Wallerstein and Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and
Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 305, 309-310 (1996) (explain that in general, after divorce, many
children and adolescents exhibit depression, aggressive behavior,
decreased self-esteem, and a sense of loss associated with the breakup of their families, whether or not they have access to both parents);
Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce:
Experiences of the Child in Later Latency, 46 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 256
(1976); Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of Parental
Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J. AMER. ACAD. CHILD
PSYCH. 600 (1975); Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, The Effects

24

of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent Experience, 3 THE CHILD IN HIS
FAMILY: CHILDREN AT PSYCHIATRIC RISK 479 (1974).
70
See Emily J. Salisbury, Kris Henning & Robert Holdford, Fathering
by Partner-Abusive Men: Attitudes on Children’s Exposure to Interparental
Conﬂict and Risk Factors for Child Abuse, CHILD MALTREATMENT, August
2009 at 232, 236, 240 (concluding that among a large sample of more
than 3,800 convicted abusers surveyed in Tennessee, 84.6% had some
type of parenting role It is known that children in intimate partner
violence (IPV) environments show maladjustment, but little research
has examined how this effect might be attributable to the parenting
style of the abuser). See also Emily F. Rothman, David G. Mandel &
Jay G. Silverman, Abusers’ Perceptions of the Effect of Their Intimate Partner
Violence on Children, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, November 2007 at
1179, 1184-1187 (concluding that abusers seem relatively oblivious
to harm they might cause their children, in which even among men
who had completed a signiﬁcant portion of a batterers’ intervention
program, only 73% believed their violence negatively impacted the
parent-child relationship, and only 53% worried about the long-term
impact of intimate partner violence on their children).
71
See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 73, at 310-311 (stating that
research at the Center for the Family in Transition on children
following divorce has revealed several factors predictive of positive
outcomes for children in divorced families and that these are
particularly striking for domestic violence cases with the ﬁrst and
paramount factor being a close, sensitive relationship with a stable
parent; other factors include reasonable cooperation with parents
and whether the child has pre-existing psychological difﬁculties;
importantly, the minimization of conﬂict between parents is vital to
the child’s well-being as the potential for future parental conduct can
threaten a child’s sense of security and undermine his feelings of
trust).
72
See Maureen Collins, Nicholson v. Williams: Who is Failing to Protect
Whom? Collaborating the Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic
Violence Services to Better Protect and Support Battered Mothers and Their
Children, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725, 750 (2004) (noting that children
removed from the non-abusive parent suffer psychological harm).

THE MODERN AMERICAN

